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ABSTRACT
This study examines auditor changes following 
events adversely affecting auditor credibility. 
Disciplinary actions against auditors by the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) are posited to be events 
damaging to auditor credibility. Agency theory and prior 
research are used to generate hypotheses about differences 
between client firms that switch auditors and client firms 
that do not switch auditors after an SEC action under Rule 
2(e) against their auditor.
A series of univariate and multivariate 
statistical tests are conducted on the sample firms. The 
sample is divided into a Switch group and a Non-Switch 
group. The sample as a whole is examined, as well as 
subgroups of clients of Big Eight auditors and clients of 
smaller auditors.
The results indicate that smaller firms are more 
likely to switch auditors after an SEC Rule 2(e) action 
than larger firms. Among clients of Big Eight auditors, 
firms with a faster rate of sales growth are more likely 
to switch auditors. Contrary to expectations derived from 
prior research, firms with audit committees are less
vii
likely to switch auditors than firms without audit 
committees. Among clients of smaller auditors, firms with 
management bonus plans tied to audited accounting data are 
less likely to switch auditors than firms without such 
compensation plans, a result opposite that predicted by 
agency theory.
Other than the differences noted between clients 
of Big Eight auditors and clients of smaller auditors, the 
most striking result of the study is the apparent failure 
of agency theory to predict the response of client firms 
to a decline in auditor credibility.
viii
CHAPTER 1 
OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY
An audit of a firm's financial statements by an 
external auditor provides users of the financial 
statements with some degree of assurance about their 
accuracy and reliability. Descriptions of the market for 
audit services suggest that this level of assurance is 
tied to the credibility of the external auditor, and that 
credibility varies across auditors. The demand for 
auditor credibility also varies across the firms 
purchasing audit services (Dopuch and Simunic 1982; 
DeAngelo 1981).— The level of auditor credibility demanded 
by a firm will be a factor in the firm's choice of an 
external auditor.
Largely unexplored in the accounting literature are 
the consequences of changes in auditor credibility. For 
example, the factors that affect the reaction of client 
firms when the credibility of their external auditor 
changes are unknown. This research seeks to examine the 
reaction of client firms to a change in the credibility of 
their external auditor, and to identify the firm 
characteristics that affect that reaction.
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Demand for Credibility 
Agency theory postulates that the self-interest of 
corporate managers can diverge from the self-interest of 
the owners of the firm. The financial statements of the 
firm provide owners with a means of monitoring the 
performance of managers. Wallace (1980) points out that 
skeptical owners will make management bear the cost of any 
perceived risk of loss due to misleading or fraudulent 
financial statements. Thus, managers have an incentive to 
provide some assurance to owners that the financial 
statements are free of material fraud or error. The audit 
of the financial statements by an external auditor 
provides that assurance. As Dopuch and Simunic (1982,
407) note:
Stockholders will rationally expect that attestation 
by a credible auditor reduces the probability that 
management is able to successfully conceal 'self 
serving behavior.'
If a credible audit increases owners' confidence that no
self-serving behavior by management is being concealed,
then it should also increase their confidence that
management's activities are more aligned with the owners'
interests, and more likely to increase the firm's expected
future cash flows. Attestation of the firm's financial
statements by a credible auditor should thus increase the
value of the firm. Dopuch and Simunic (1982) note that
management's wealth will increase to the extent that
compensation is tied to the value of the firm.
3In determining what level of auditor credibility to
"purchase," firm management must balance the benefits of a
credible audit discussed against its costs. The chief
cost to management of a credible audit will be the utility
of self-serving behavior foregone. The point where the
marginal benefit of a credible audit equals the marginal
cost will vary across firms. DeAngelo (1981, 185) states:
Differential agency costs across firms and over time 
for a given firm imply a heterogeneous demand for 
audit services, i.e., differing 'levels* of auditing 
are demanded.
Also, Francis and Wilson (1988, 663) note that "it follows 
that when agency costs are greater there is increased 
demand for higher-level audit quality."
Assessment of Credibility 
Unlike consumers of most other goods, users of 
audited financial statements have no means of directly 
assessing the quality of the product. Financial statement 
users do not directly observe audit procedures and have 
little information about the contractual arrangements, and 
resulting incentives, that may exist between the auditor 
and the client firm (DeAngelo 1981). Unable to directly 
assess audit quality, users develop observable proxies 
that are associated with audit quality. DeAngelo (1981) 
proposed auditor size as a surrogate for audit quality. 
Another potential proxy is the reputation of the audit 
firm. Dopuch and Simunic (1982, 408) argue:
Since in the United States the only audit 
characteristic disclosed to users today is an 
auditor’s identity, credibility must be associated 
solely with an auditor's name.
If the only observable indicator of audit quality is
the auditor's name, then it follows that events adversely
affecting the reputation of an audit firm diminish the
perceived quality of audits performed by the firm. Dopuch
and Simunic (1982, 411) note that "changes in credibility
will . . . derive from public information about auditors."
Wilson and Grimlund (1990) examined actions against public
accounting firms by the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC), and found that these actions appeared to adversely
affect auditor credibility. The nature of these actions
by the SEC is discussed in more detail below.
The SEC and Auditor Credibility 
Rule 2(e) of the SEC's Rules of Practice allows the 
SEC to impose penalties against auditors who have engaged 
in improper or unethical professional conduct, or who have 
willfully violated or aided in the violation of federal 
securities laws. Rule 2(e) allows the SEC to prohibit 
individuals or firms from practicing before the SEC, 
mandate a review of audit procedures by other audit firms, 
or prohibit an audit firm from accepting new, publicly 
held clients for a specified period of time. Enforcement 
activities resulting from Rule 2(e) are published by the
SEC as part of their Accounting and Auditing Enforcement
Releases (AAERs). Poloway (1987, 516) notes:
. . . [the Rule's] mere existence induces considerable 
compliance, particularly in the practice of 
accounting, where there is always the danger of 
irreparable damage to a professional reputation.
The prohibition against practicing before the SEC and/or
against accepting new clients is an especially powerful
weapon. Stevens (1981, 211) quotes the general counsel of
an accounting firm as saying "Rule 2 (e) is the atomic bomb
and the SEC has it."
Actions against audit firms by the SEC under Rule
2(e) are uncommon. Business Week (1984, 132) noted that
"private litigation over audits is commonplace, but the
SEC will step in only if the mistakes are glaring and
frequent." Descriptive evidence of the consequences of
SEC actions to an auditor's reputation can be found in the
business press. A case in point is the 1983 action by the
SEC against the audit firm Fox & Co. An article in the
business press emphasized the effect of the action on Fox
& Co.'s reputation:
U.S. Minerals Exploration Co., . . ., recently 
dismissed Fox and went with Price Waterhouse. "We 
were very pleased with Fox's service and fees. But 
Fox's problems became our problems," says . . . U.S. 
Minerals' president. "Because of the SEC problem," he 
explains, "we started to get some flak from investment 
bankers." (Business Week 1984, 133)
Wilson and Grimlund (1990) examined client reaction 
to SEC actions under Rule 2(e). Their results indicated
that an auditor affected by an SEC action tended to lose 
market share to its competitors. Additionally, auditors 
involved in SEC actions had more difficulty retaining 
clients and attracting new clients than did other 
auditors. The results were consistent with the view that 
SEC actions under Rule 2(e) are events that adversely 
affect the credibility of audit firms.
Wilson and Grimlund (1990) examined client reaction 
subsequent to an SEC action against an auditor. Their 
hypotheses focused on the effects of the SEC action 
itself, as opposed to the original audit failure that led 
to the SEC action. Their results, as well as the 
descriptive evidence discussed above, support the 
conclusion that actions by the SEC under Rule 2(e) are 
public events that can adversely affect the credibility of 
an audit firm. However, the issue of changes in auditor 
credibility has not been given much attention in the 
accounting literature. Most research to date has treated 
auditor credibility as a constant over time.
Research Objectives
This research has two main objectives. The first is 
to identify the factors affecting client firm reaction to 
a decline in external auditor credibility. Second, this 
research will attempt to provide some initial insight into 
whether the determinants of client reaction to a decline
7in auditor credibility differ between clients of Big Eight 
auditors and clients of non-Big Eight auditors.
Wilson and Grimlund (1990) found that SEC actions 
under Rule 2(e) appeared to lower auditor credibility.1 
The use of such actions as events damaging auditor 
credibility allows these objectives to be articulated in 
the form of the following research questions:
1. On what dimensions do firms that switch auditors 
after an SEC Rule 2 (e) action against their 
external auditor differ from firms that do not 
switch auditors after such an action?
2. Are the differences between firms that switch 
auditors and firms that do not switch auditors 
after an SEC Rule 2(e) action against their 
external auditor similar for clients of Big Eight 
auditors and clients of smaller auditors?
Hypotheses derived from agency theory and prior research
will test these research questions. The data to test the
hypotheses will be drawn from the financial statements and
proxy statements of sample firms.
Research Method 
Actions by the SEC against auditors under Rule 2(e) 
of the SEC's Rules of Practice will be used as events that 
adversely affected the credibility of an auditor. A 
sample of Rule 2(e) actions will be drawn from prior 
research and the SEC's Accounting and Auditing Enforcement
1 Although other events may damage auditor 
credibility, the study is limited to an examination of SEC 
actions under Rule 2(e).
Releases (AAERs). The clients of auditors cited by the 
SEC will be divided into two groups. One group will 
consist of firms that switched auditors within the two 
years following the SEC action.2 The other group will 
consist of firms that did not switch auditors within the 
two year period.3 Client firms that declared bankruptcy 
or were acquired by other firms within the two year period 
will not be included in the sample.
Both univariate and multivariate tests will be used 
to investigate differences between the two groups of 
sample firms. First, the t-statistic will be calculated 
and tested for significant differences in the continuous 
independent variables. Because of a lack of prior 
knowledge about the distributional characteristics of the 
independent variables, the nonparametric Mann-Whitney test 
will also be conducted to provide additional assurance
2 A limitation of this approach is that it does not 
include clients that anticipate an SEC action and switch 
auditors prior to the announcement of the action.
However, the results of Wilson and Grimlund (1990) 
indicate a significant client reaction after the 
announcement of the SEC action.
3 Some client firms may have entered into multi-year 
engagement contracts with their auditor, and thus are 
unable to switch auditors within the two year period.
Since information as to the nature of individual 
engagement contracts is not publicly available, the 
inability of client firms to switch auditors due to 
contractual obligations represents a potential confounding 
factor in the study. Healy and Lys (1986) also employed a 
two year period in their examination of auditor changes 
following audit firm mergers.
about the results of the t-tests. Differences in 
dichotomous independent variables will be examined by 
means of a Chi-square test for independence of 
classification.
The multivariate tests will provide additional 
assurance about the univariate test results. A logistic 
regression (logit) model will be employed to determine the 
impact of the independent variables on the decision of a 
firm to switch auditors following an SEC action against 
the firm's auditor. A statistically significant 
coefficient for an independent variable will be 
interpreted as evidence that the variable affects the 
probability that a firm will switch auditors following an 
SEC action against its external auditor.
Expected Contribution
This research will provide additional insight into
the nature of the demand for auditor credibility. Dopuch
and Simunic (1982, 443) note:
The theory of auditor credibility and differences in 
credibility across firms implies that the means 
through which auditors acquire and lose credibility is 
an important area of study. At this time, we know 
very little about these processes.
Results of this research will be of benefit to auditors.
Knowledge of the factors influencing a client's decision
to switch auditors following events that adversely affect
external auditor credibility will allow auditors to more
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accurately assess the consequences of such events. With a 
better understanding of the costs of a decline in 
credibility, auditors will be better equipped to determine 
the optimal level of resources allocated to maintaining 
audit quality and minimizing the chances of a credibility 
reducing event.
This research will also benefit auditors who have 
experienced a decline in credibility. By identifying 
which clients are most sensitive to auditor credibility 
the auditor will be able to maximize the effectiveness of 
its efforts to retain existing clients and attract new 
ones. The audit firm will have the means to better target 
its marketing strategy as it seeks to recover from the 
effects of a loss of credibility.
Results of this research will also have public 
policy implications. The SEC will have information to 
enable it to more fully assess the punitive impact of its 
actions against auditors under Rule 2(e). A more thorough 
understanding of the consequences of a Rule 2(e) action 
can allow the SEC to better determine when a Rule 2(e) 
action is an appropriate regulatory response in dealing 
with an audit firm's violation of existing rules.
Summary
This chapter has presented an overview of the 
study. The demand for and assessment of auditor
credibility was discussed, as well as the impact of SEC 
Rule 2(e) actions on auditor credibility. The research 
objectives of the study were described, and the research 
method to be employed was presented. The expected 
contribution of the study was also discussed. The next 
chapter will present a review of the relevant literature.
A detailed description of the research method used will be 
presented in the third chapter. The fourth chapter will 
discuss the results of the study, and the fifth chapter 
will provide a discussion of the implications and 
limitations of the study, as well as suggestions for 
future research.
CHAPTER 2 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
The accounting research in the area of auditor 
credibility can be divided into two general types. One 
stream of research has attempted to measure capital market 
perceptions of auditor credibility. The other has 
attempted to assess the demand for audit quality by 
analyzing the auditor choices of client firms. These two 
approaches to the examination of auditor credibility, as 
well as other research in the area, are reviewed in 
subsequent sections of this chapter.
Market Based Research 
Nichols and Smith (1985) investigated the market 
reaction to clients switching between Big Eight auditors 
and smaller auditors. If there is a positive correlation 
between auditor size and audit quality, as postulated by 
DeAngelo (1981), then firms switching from a Big Eight 
auditor to a smaller auditor should experience a negative 
market reaction. A positive market reaction would be 
expected for a client switching to a Big Eight auditor 
from a smaller auditor. Although Nichols and Smith (1985) 
did observe market reactions in the directions predicted,
12
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the magnitudes involved were not statistically 
significant.
Ettredge, Shane, and Smith (1988, 32) related the
quality of an audit to the extent that accounting income
is correlated with future dividends:
Higher quality audits should be associated with 
earnings reports that are more reflective of the 
underlying events useful for predicting future 
dividend flows.
From this perspective, the higher the quality of the
audit, the more likely it is that unexpected earnings
accurately reflect changes in future dividend flows.
Faced with a change in expected future dividends, the
market will adjust security returns accordingly. If a
firm's financial statements are audited by a lower quality
auditor, investors may perceive that some portion of
unexpected earnings are due to errors and manipulation by
management, rather than events signaling a change in
future dividends. The market would thus be less likely to
respond to unexpected earnings. If Big Eight auditors
provide higher quality audits than smaller auditors, then
the correlation of unexpected earnings and abnormal
security returns should be higher for clients of Big Eight
auditors than for clients of smaller auditors. After
controlling for client size and the sign of unexpected
earnings, the results were consistent with the hypothesis
that Big Eight auditors do provide higher quality audits.
Beatty (1989) examined the relationship between 
auditor reputation and market returns for initial public 
offerings in the capital market. He found evidence 
consistent with the hypothesis that clients employing a 
more reputable auditor will receive a higher price for its 
stock. Investors appear willing to pay a higher price, 
and thus accept a lower return, for the stock of a firm 
associated with a more credible auditor.
Eichenseher, Hagigi, and Shields (1989) investigated 
market reaction to changes in auditors by firms whose 
securities are traded over-the-counter (OTC). They found 
a generally negative reaction to auditor changes, perhaps 
indicating stockholder skepticism about management's 
motives for the change. The extent of the security price 
response to an auditor switch was affected by the level of 
management ownership in the firm. The greater the share 
of management ownership in the firm, the more negative the 
market reaction to the switch in auditors. The results 
also indicated that the market responds more favorably to 
changes to a Big Eight auditor than changes from a Big 
Eight auditor. This finding supports the hypothesis that 
firms use the auditor selection decision as a signaling 
mechanism to the market. A change to a Big Eight auditor 
can be interpreted as a positive signal about the firm's 
future prospects.
Johnson and Lys (1990) were unable to document any 
market reaction to a firm's announcement of a change from 
a smaller auditor to a larger auditor. An examination of 
profitability for the three years prior to announcement of 
the change in auditors revealed that firms switching to 
larger auditors tended to outperform firms switching to 
smaller auditors. However, firms that did not switch 
auditors were, on average, more profitable than firms that 
did switch auditors, regardless of the direction of the 
switch.
Client Choice Research
Carpenter and Strawser (1971) examined corporations
planning initial stock offerings. They found that these
companies often replace their local or regional CPA firms
with a national auditor. They (1971, 58) concluded:
. . . substantial emphasis appears to be placed on a 
national firm's reputation as a known stamp of 
financial statement reliability. . . .
Palmrose (1984) investigated the association between
agency cost variables and auditor selection. She
hypothesized that the higher a firm's agency costs, the
more likely the firm would engage a higher-quality
auditor. An auditor was considered a high quality auditor
if it was one of the Big Eight or was a specialist in the
same industry as the client firm. Results were
16
inconclusive, with only firm size significantly related to 
the choice of a higher-quality auditor.
Healy and Lys (1986) examined clients of smaller 
auditors that had merged with Big Eight auditors. They 
postulated that a client would remain with the acquiring 
Big Eight auditor if it benefitted from the larger 
auditor's specialized services and/or reputation. The 
clients who would not benefit from these advantages were 
more likely to switch to a non-Big Eight auditor after the 
merger. Healy and Lys (1986) predicted that a client's 
demand for the increased reputation of a Big Eight auditor 
was related to the client's size, rate of growth, and 
plans to issue debt or equity in the near future. Their 
results indicated that clients remaining with the 
acquiring Big Eight auditor tended to be larger and have 
higher growth rates than those clients returning to a 
smaller auditor. No strong evidence was found to indicate 
that clients planning to issue debt or equity in the near 
future were more likely to remain with the Big Eight 
auditor.
DeFond (1987) hypothesized that changes in 
management ownership, firm leverage, and short-term 
accruals are related to the firm's demand for audit 
quality. Decreases in the level of management ownership 
of the firm and increases in firm leverage were expected 
to lead to an increased demand for a quality audit.
17
DeFond (1987) notes that a firm's management has a large 
amount of discretion in determining the firm's short-term 
accruals. The larger the level of accruals, the greater 
the potential for management manipulation of accruals.
Thus, DeFond (1987) posits a link between increases in 
accruals and the demand for a higher-quality audit to 
monitor management activities.
DeFond (1987) identified four surrogates for audit 
quality. These surrogates were auditor size, brand-name 
reputation (Big Eight versus non-Big Eight), industry 
expertise, and independence. The independence of an 
auditor with respect to any single client was measured as 
the level of the client's revenues relative to the 
revenues of all clients audited by the auditor. A linear 
combination of the four surrogates was developed to 
generate a comprehensive proxy for audit quality. Results 
indicated that changes in management ownership and 
leverage were significantly associated with the selection 
of a high-quality auditor. Changes in short-term accruals 
were not significant.
Francis and Wilson (1988) tested the association
between a firm's agency costs and its demand for a quality
audit. They (1988, 667) theorize the following:
. . .  a higher quality audit can be considered as part 
of the complex control system that mitigates the 
relative inability of diffused ownership to directly 
monitor and control management action.
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Audit quality was defined first as a dichotomous variable 
(Big Eight auditors vs. all other auditors), and as a 
continuous variable based on total client sales audited by 
the auditor. Francis and Wilson (1988) found an 
association between agency cost proxies and auditor choice 
when the first measure of audit quality was used. No 
consistent results were found for the continuous measure 
of audit quality.
Williams (1988) investigated firms that switched 
from one Big Eight auditor to another. He found that in 
selecting an auditor, clients appear to value industry 
expertise and longevity. Firms were less likely to switch 
auditors if their current auditor was a specialist in 
their industry. Firms that had an established, long-term 
relationship with their auditors were also less likely to 
switch auditors. Williams (1988) also found that firms 
receiving negative media publicity were more likely to 
switch auditors than other firms. Williams (1988, 259) 
notes:
The client's reputation also tends to influence 
auditor changes. Clients that received a tarnished 
reputation appear to seek new auditors in an attempt 
to renew the managers' faith in the monitoring of 
financial statements.
Williams (1988) concluded that the results do not support
the common assertion that opinion shopping is a primary
motivation for auditor switching.
Another test of the association between auditor 
choice and agency cost variables was provided by 
Eichenseher and Shields (1989). Consistent with Francis 
and Wilson (1988), they postulate a positive relationship 
between a firm's agency costs and its demand for a higher- 
quality audit. However, in some cases, the transactions 
costs of switching auditors outweigh the agency cost 
savings achieved by aligning with a higher-quality 
auditor. The relative size of the transactions costs and 
agency cost savings will determine if the firm switches to 
a higher-quality auditor. From this perspective, the 
switch to a higher-quality auditor can result in changes 
in either incremental agency costs or incremental 
transactions costs. If the firm has reached the decision 
to terminate its current auditor for reasons unrelated to 
agency costs, such as a decline in the auditor-client 
working relationship, then the marginal transactions cost 
of switching to a higher-quality auditor is zero.
Increases in a firm's external financing, or changes in 
management's share of firm ownership can alter the savings 
in agency costs realized by switching auditors.
Whether the auditor switch was brought about by 
declines in incremental transactions costs or by increases 
in agency cost savings, a firm switching auditors will 
select a new auditor that offers a level of audit quality 
that best fits the firm's needs. Therefore, the
relationship between agency costs and auditor selection 
should be stronger for firms that have recently switched 
auditors than for firms that have remained with their 
current auditor for several years. Eichenseher and 
Shields (1989) found that agency cost variables explained 
auditor selection for firms that had recently changed 
auditors, while no significant association was found for 
firms that had not switched auditors. For firms that did 
switch auditors, the association between agency cost 
variables and auditor selection was greater two years 
after the switch than at the time of the switch. This 
result indicates that firm may switch auditors in 
anticipation of changes in agency costs. Overall, the 
results of Eichenseher and Shields (1989) support the 
argument that the decision to switch auditors is affected 
by both transactions costs and agency costs.
Wilson and Grimlund (1990) examined client reaction 
to SEC actions under Rule 2(e). Their results indicated 
that an auditor affected by an SEC action tended to lose 
market share to its competitors. Also, auditors involved 
in SEC actions had more difficulty retaining clients and 
attracting new clients than other auditors. The results 
were consistent with the view that SEC actions under Rule 
2(e) are events that adversely affect the credibility of 
audit firms.
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Other Research
Schroeder, Solomon, and Vickrey (1986) surveyed 
audit committee chairs of Fortune 500 companies in an 
attempt to determine the factors they perceived as 
affecting audit quality. The results indicated that the 
committee chairs rated audit-team specific factors as more 
important in determining audit quality than firm-wide 
factors. For example, items such as the level of 
partner/manager attention given to the audit and 
communications between the audit team and management 
ranked higher than litigation involving the CPA firm and 
the recency and outcome of the auditor's peer review.
Palmrose (1988) attempted to use litigation as a 
means for making audit quality distinctions among 
auditors. She posited an inverse relationship between 
audit quality and litigation rates. Within her framework, 
litigation arises when an audit failure occurs in 
conjunction with losses to either the client or the users 
of the client's financial statements. Since audit 
failures are less likely when high quality audits are 
performed, higher quality auditors should be the target of 
less litigation than their lower quality counterparts. 
Palmrose's results indicate that non-Big Eight auditors as 
a group had higher litigation
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occurrence rates than the Big Eight. This outcome is 
consistent with Big Eight auditors providing higher 
quality audits than their smaller competitors.
Knapp (1988) surveyed commercial loan officers to 
determine the effects of auditor switches on the 
credibility of a switching firm's financial statements.
The results indicated that a financially healthy firm that 
switched from a non-Big Eight auditor to a Big Eight 
auditor did not significantly increase the credibility of 
its financial statements. However, financially troubled 
firms did increase the credibility of their financial 
statements by switching from a non-Big Eight auditor to a 
Big Eight auditor.
Summary
With the exception of Carpenter and Strawser (1971), 
most accounting research in the area of auditor 
credibility is of relatively recent origin. The 
literature has tended to treat auditor credibility as an 
intertemporal constant, with only Healy and Lys (1986) and 
Wilson and Grimlund (1990) investigating the reaction of 
client firms to changes in auditor credibility. Healy and 
Lys (1986) examined an event wherein the reputation of a 
client's auditor was increased through merger with a Big 
Eight auditor. Wilson and Grimlund (1990) examined an
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event where the reputation of a client's auditor was 
adversely affected.
Another characteristic of the research to date is 
the absence of an accepted measure of auditor credibility. 
Most studies have treated auditor credibility as a 
categorical variable— Big Eight auditors vs. all other 
auditors. Attempts to create a finer measure have met 
with mixed results. Beatty (1989) examined the cash 
compensation paid to auditors by firms involved in initial 
public offerings of stock. He found a positive 
correlation between auditor compensation and the price 
paid for the stock by the market. The results are 
consistent with investors paying a higher price (and thus 
accepting a lower return) for the stock of firms 
associated with a higher quality auditor.
Francis and Wilson (1988) tested the association 
between a firm's agency costs and its demand for a 
credible audit. When a simple Big Eight vs. non-Big Eight 
auditor choice variable was used, the results indicated 
that a firm's agency costs were positively related to its 
demand for an audit by a Big Eight firm. When a 
continuous auditor choice variable (based on client sales 
audited) was employed, no consistent association between 
agency costs and auditor choice was found.
DeFond (1987) combined auditor size, industry 
expertise, and independence into a single measure of
auditor credibility. Using this measure, an association 
between a client firm's agency costs and its choice of 
auditor was documented. Johnson and Lys (1990) used the 
relative size of a firm's new auditor to its previous 
auditor as a measure of audit quality. They found a 
positive correlation between firm growth and movement to a 
larger auditor.
The measures of auditor credibility used in the 
literature have, for the most part, not incorporated 
differences in credibility among Big Eight auditors, or 
among smaller audit firms. The use of a categorical 
measure of credibility implicitly assumes that all Big 
Eight auditors offer an equal level of credibility. 
Similarly, all smaller audit firms are assumed to offer a 
single level of credibility. Although the research to 
date has provided insight into some factors affecting a 
firm's decision to employ a Big Eight vs. non-Big Eight 
auditor, less is known about the factors affecting a 
firm's decision to switch from one Big Eight auditor to 
another, or from one smaller auditor to another.
CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHOD
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the 
research method used in the study. The first section 
presents the objectives and research questions.
Subsequent sections review agency theory and prior 
research used to generate research hypotheses.
Measurement of variables and sample selection are then 
discussed. The final part of the chapter details the 
statistical techniques employed to analyze the data.
Research Objectives
This research has two main objectives. The first is 
to identify the factors affecting client firm reaction to 
a decline in external auditor credibility. Second, this 
research will attempt to provide some initial insight into 
whether the determinants of client reaction to a decline 
in auditor credibility differ between clients of Big Eight 
auditors and clients of smaller auditors.
Wilson and Grimlund (1990) found that SEC actions 
under Rule 2(e) appeared to reduce auditor credibility.
The use of such actions as events damaging auditor
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credibility allows these objectives to be articulated in 
the form of the following research questions:
1. On what dimensions do firms that switch auditors 
after an SEC Rule 2(e) action against their 
external auditor differ from firms that do not 
switch auditors after such an action?
2. Are the differences between firms that switch 
auditors and firms that do not switch auditors 
after an SEC Rule 2(e) action against their 
external auditor similar for clients of Big 
Eight auditors and clients of smaller auditors?
Switching auditors is a costly activity for client 
firms. A firm retaining a new auditor will incur start-up 
costs in the form of audit fees and demands on management 
time as the auditor evaluates the firm's accounting system 
(Healy and Lys 1986). In making the decision to switch 
auditors after an SEC Rule 2(e) action, a firm must weigh 
the costs of switching against its demand for credible 
auditing. The following sections draw upon agency theory 
and prior research to identify some factors affecting firm 
demand for auditor credibility.
Agency Theory 
Agency theory posits a divergence between the self- 
interest of the manager of a firm and the interests of the 
owners and creditors of the firm. Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) argue that the degree of divergence is tied to the 
extent of management ownership in the firm. A manager 
with an ownership stake in the firm will have less
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incentive to shirk and more incentive to take actions
maximizing firm cash flows. Extending this line of
reasoning, Francis and Wilson (1988, 666) argue:
It follows from this argument that firms with higher 
levels of manager ownership would have less need for 
higher-quality audits than would firms with lower 
levels of manager ownership assuming a "convergence of 
interests" as manager ownership increases.
If firms with a high degree of manager ownership have less
need for a credible audit, then one would expect the
degree of manager ownership to be a factor affecting a
firm's decision to switch auditors following a decline in
external auditor credibility. This leads to the first
hypothesis (stated in the alternative form):
HI: Ceteris paribus, the smaller the manager's
ownership in the firm, the higher the probability 
that the firm will switch auditors 
following an SEC Rule 2(e) action against the 
firm's external auditor.
Research investigating the relationship between manager
ownership and auditor choice has yielded mixed results.
Francis and Wilson (1988) tested the degree of management
ownership as a factor affecting the probability that a
firm switching auditors would select a Big Eight auditor.
No significant result was found. Eichenseher and Shields
(1989) found that management ownership was positively
associated with the switch to a Big Eight auditor.
Palmrose (1984) notes that one method owners use to
limit the divergence of interests between managers and
owners is a management compensation plan tied to reported
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financial performance. Since compensation plans of this
nature rely on accounting-based financial information, a
firm using such a plan will incur additional monitoring
costs. The increased need for monitoring can lead to a
demand for a higher credibility audit by the firm (Francis
and Wilson 1988). Thus, the second hypothesis
(alternative form) to be tested is:
H2: Ceteris paribus, a firm with an accounting-based 
management compensation plan is more likely to 
switch auditors following an SEC Rule 2(e) action 
against the firm's external auditor than a firm 
without an accounting-based management 
compensation plan.
Palmrose (1984) found no significant association 
between the existence of an accounting-based management 
compensation plan and the probability that a firm would 
select a Big Eight auditor. Francis and Wilson (1988) 
also reported a lack of significance. However, Francis 
and Wilson (1988) did find that the implementation or 
termination of a management bonus plan over a three-year 
period was significantly associated with firm choice of a 
Big Eight vs. smaller auditor.
Another aspect of agency theory is the conflict of
interest between the owner/managers of a firm and the
firm's debtholders. Watts and Zimmerman (1986) discuss
the incentives of the owner/manager to transfer wealth
from the debtholders. Palmrose (1984, 233) argues:
. . . the greater the proportion of debt in a 
company's capital structure, the greater the potential
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for wealth transfers (that is, agency costs) from 
bondholders to shareholders.
The greater the potential for wealth transfers, the more
likely creditors will be to include accounting-based
covenants in loan agreements. These covenants are
designed to limit the ability of managers to effect these
transfers. Credible audits provide debtholders with a
means of monitoring the debt covenants. The demand for
credible auditing should therefore be positively
associated with the amount of debt in a firm's capital
structure (Palmrose 1984; Eichenseher and Shields 1989).
Francis and Wilson (1988) posit a negative
association between debt and the demand for credibility.
They (1988, 667) state:
If a firm switches to a lower-quality auditor, the 
value of existing debt claims is expected to drop, 
thus, increasing the value of stockholders' residual 
claims. Based on this reasoning, it is hypothesized 
that firms with higher debt levels are more likely to 
switch to a lower-quality auditor.
Francis and Wilson (1988) found the expected negative
association between firm leverage and choice of Big Eight
auditor. Eichenseher and Shields (1989) found a positive
relationship between a firm's debt level and its tendency
to choose a Big Eight auditor. Palmrose (1984) found a
negative, although statistically insignificant,
relationship between firm leverage and selection of a Big
Eight auditor. Given the disagreement in the literature
about the relationship between existing debt and the
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demand for credibility, no directional hypothesis can be
formulated about the effect of leverage on a firm's
decision to switch auditors following an SEC Rule 2(e)
action against the firm's external auditor. Therefore,
the third hypothesis, stated in the alternative, is:
H3: Ceteris paribus, a firm switching auditors 
following an SEC Rule 2(e) action against the 
firm's external auditor will have a significantly 
different degree of leverage, on average, than 
will a firm not switching auditors after an SEC 
action.
The relationship between a firm's future financing
plans and its demand for credibility seems clearer than is
the case with existing debt. As discussed earlier,
Carpenter and Strawser (1971) found that firms issuing
stock for the first time tended to switch to a national
auditor. Healy and Lys (1986, 254) note:
Big Eight reputations are likely to be particularly 
valuable to clients that anticipate raising debt or 
equity in national or international financial markets, 
since the Big Eight reputation lowers the information 
costs of potential investors. Conversely, Big Eight 
brand names will be less valuable for clients that 
finance investments internally and do not anticipate 
raising outside capital.
Thus, a positive association between a firm's future
financing plans and its demand for auditor credibility is
expected. This leads to the hypothesis (alternative
form):
H4: Ceteris paribus, a firm issuing debt or equity 
will be more likely to switch auditors following 
an SEC Rule 2(e) action against the firm's 
external auditor than will a firm with no plans to 
raise funds.
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Empirical results to date have been mixed. Healy and Lys 
(1986) found that the issuance of debt or equity did not 
appear to affect a firm's choice of auditor. Francis and 
Wilson (1988) found a positive relationship between a 
firm's issuance of equity or debt and its decision to 
retain a Big Eight auditor.
Two other characteristics that may affect firm 
response to changes in auditor credibility are the size of 
the firm and the growth of the firm. Palmrose (1984) 
notes that as the size of the firm increases, so do its 
agency costs. A larger, more rapidly growing firm is 
likely to enter into more agency relationships, and the 
scale of firm operations makes observation of management 
by owners more difficult. Larger, growing firms must rely 
more upon audits as a means of monitoring. A positive 
association is therefore expected between firm size and 
growth, and firm demand for credibility. From the 
perspective of agency theory, larger and more rapidly 
growing firms should be more likely to react by changing 
auditors when an event adversely affects the credibility 
of their external auditor.
A different view of the relationship between firm 
size and the demand for credibility can be gained when the 
amount of information available about different sizes of 
firms is considered. Wilson and Grimlund (1990) note that 
for large firms, financial statements comprise only a
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small part of the information set upon which estimates of
future cash flows are based. These alternative sources of
information allow the market to anticipate most of the
information contained in the firm's financial statements.
Wilson and Grimlund (1990, 48) conclude:
Events affecting the credibility of the financial 
statements themselves (such as an SEC action against 
an audit firm) may have comparatively little effect on 
estimates of expected cash flows.
The financial statements of smaller firms make up a large
part of the information set upon which estimates of future
cash flows are based (Grant 1980; Atiase 1985). Events
affecting the credibility of a smaller firm's financial
statements may have a larger impact on its stock price
than similar events for a larger firm. Wilson and
Grimlund (1990, 48) suggest:
Management of a smaller firm may have greater 
incentive to retain a credible auditor, or to switch 
to a more credible public accounting firm if their 
current auditor suffers a perceived loss of 
reputation.
Based on the above discussion, no directional hypothesis 
can be formulated about the influence of firm size and 
growth on a firm's decision to switch auditors following 
an SEC Rule 2(e) action against the firm's external 
auditor. The hypotheses (stated in the alternative) to be 
tested are:
H5: Ceteris paribus, a firm switching auditors 
following an SEC Rule 2(e) action against the 
firm's external auditor will, on average, differ
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significantly in size from a firm that does not 
switch auditors after an SEC action.
H6: Ceteris paribus, a firm switching auditors 
following an SEC Rule 2(e) action against the 
firm's external auditor will, on average, have a 
rate of growth significantly different from a firm 
that does not switch auditors after an SEC action.
Several studies have attempted to test whether firm
size and firm growth are related to auditor choice.
Palmrose (1984) found a positive relationship between firm
size and selection of a Big Eight auditor. Healy and Lys
(1986) found that large, rapidly growing firms were more
likely to retain a Big Eight auditor. Eichenseher and
Shields (1989) found mixed support for a positive
association between size and choice of a Big Eight
auditor. Wilson and Grimlund (1990) found that auditors
involved in an SEC action were more likely to lose market
share among the small client market segment than for the
market as a whole.
Variables Drawn From Prior Research 
Some findings from previous research suggest 
additional factors affecting firm response to changes in 
external auditor credibility. Lynn (1985) surveyed firms 
with and without audit committees about the relative 
importance of auditor selection criteria. She found that 
the national prestige of an auditor was more important to 
firms with audit committees than to firms without audit 
committees. Since auditor prestige is more important to
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firms with audit committees, these firms are expected to
be more likely to respond to a loss of auditor prestige by
changing auditors. This leads to the hypothesis
(alternative form):
H7: Ceteris paribus, a firm with a corporate audit 
committee is more likely to switch auditors 
following an SEC Rule 2(e) action against the 
firm's external auditor than a firm without a 
corporate audit committee.
Schwartz and Menon (1985) postulate that a firm
purchasing an audit is acquiring a package of attributes,
including the reputation of the auditor, its industry
expertise, and its responsiveness to client needs. The
firm's weighting of the importance of each of these
attributes governs its selection of an auditor. However,
the firm's attribute weighting may not remain stable over
time. As Schwartz and Menon (1985, 252) note:
A company will optimize the package of services it 
receives by making trade-offs among the various 
dimensions of the audit product subject to the 
constraint of audit cost. A deterioration in 
financial condition can result in the purchasers of 
the audit services changing the importance attached to 
different dimensions of the audit product as well as 
to the cost of the audit itself.
Schwartz and Menon (1985) found that firms nearing
bankruptcy were more likely to switch to a different class
of auditor, from a Big Eight auditor to a smaller auditor,
or from a smaller auditor to a Big Eight auditor. The
results indicate that financial distress may cause firms
to reorder their priorities, including the importance of
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auditor reputation, in selecting an auditor. Thus, firm 
response to an event adversely affecting the credibility 
of an external auditor is expected to be associated with 
the financial health of the firm. The limited research to 
date on this issue provides no evidence about the 
direction of this relationship. Stated in the 
alternative, the hypothesis to be tested is:
H8: Ceteris paribus, a firm switching auditors 
following an SEC Rule 2 (e) action against the 
firm's external auditor will, on average, have a 
level of financial health different from a firm 
that does not switch auditors following an SEC 
action.
Another factor that may affect a firm's decision to 
switch auditors following an SEC Rule 2(e) action against 
its external auditor is the industry to which the firm 
belongs. Shockley and Holt (1S83) surveyed chief 
financial officers of banks and found a close relationship 
between the perceived banking industry expertise of an 
auditor and the auditor's share of the banking market.
The findings of Shockley and Holt (1983) suggest that 
there may be an industry specific component to auditor 
credibility. If so, firms may be reluctant to terminate 
relationships with auditors perceived as specialists in 
their industry. The following hypothesis (alternative 
form) can be formulated:
H9: Ceteris paribus, a firm will be less likely to 
switch auditors following an SEC Rule 2(e) action 
against the firm's external auditor if the auditor 
is a specialist in that firm's industry.
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In addition to an industry specific component to 
auditor credibility, prior research has suggested that a 
geographic component to credibility exists. Wilson and 
Grimlund (1990) found that the negative consequences of an 
SEC action were more severe in the state where the audit 
failure that had triggered the action occurred than for 
the nation as a whole. An auditor was less able to retain 
existing clients and attract new clients in the state 
focused on by the SEC action. This result leads to the 
following hypothesis (alternative form):
H10: Ceteris paribus, a firm will be more likely to 
switch auditors following an SEC Rule 2(e) 
action against the firm's external auditor if 
the SEC action deals with an audit failure in 
the firm's state.
One research objective of this study is to provide 
some insight into whether the factors affecting a firm's 
decision to switch auditors following an event adversely 
affecting the credibility of the firm's external auditor 
differed between clients of Big Eight auditors and clients 
of smaller auditors. Since theory and prior research 
provide no expectations about the direction or magnitude 
of differences between clients of Big Eight auditors and 
clients of smaller auditors, no directional hypothesis can 
be formulated about these differences. The hypothesis 
(alternative form) to be tested is:
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Hll: Ceteris paribus, any differences between firms
that do and do not switch auditors following an 
SEC Rule 2(e) action will not be the same for
clients of Big Eight auditors as for clients of
smaller auditors.
Measurement of Variables
The degree of management ownership (MOWN) was 
measured by dividing the number of shares of common stock 
owned by management by the total number of shares of stock 
outstanding. Information about the degree of management 
ownership was available in a firm's annual proxy statement 
or Form 10-K. Also, revealed in a firm's proxy statement 
is the existence of a management bonus plan (MBONUS). A 
dichotomous variable was used to represent the disclosure, 
or lack of disclosure, of such a plan.
Firm leverage (DEBT) was measured as the ratio of a
firm's total debt to its total assets. A similar measure
was employed by Eichenseher and Shields (198,9) . The 
information necessary to calculate leverage was available 
in a firm's audited financial statements. As discussed 
earlier, there is disagreement in the literature about the 
association between firm leverage and the demand for 
credibility.
Firm financial statements contained information 
about new issues of debt or equity by a firm. The 
variable NISSUE was defined as the total dollar amount of 
such issues in the three years following an SEC action
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against the firm's auditor scaled by the firm's total 
assets at the time of the SEC action. A similar approach 
was taken by Healy and Lys (198 6).
Two measures were employed as proxies for firm sise 
(SIZE) and rate of growth (GROWTH). The first approach 
was to use the total assets of a firm as a proxy for firm 
size (SIZE), while the percentage change in assets over 
the three year period before the SEC action was used as a 
measure of firm growth (GROWTH). Similar measures of size 
and growth were used by Francis and Wilson (1988) and 
Healy and Lys (1986). The second proxies for these 
variables employed a firm's annual sales as the measures 
of SIZE and GROWTH. Consistent with prior research, the 
natural logarithms of assets and sales were used in the 
analyses. As discussed above, no clear expectations can 
be drawn about the relationship of these variables to the 
probability that a firm will switch auditors after an 
event adversely affecting the credibility of its external 
auditor.
Firm proxy statements and annual reports were 
examined for the presence of a corporate audit committee 
(AUDCOM). A dichotomous zero/one variable measured the 
absence/existence of an audit committee.
A measure of firm financial distress (FDIST) was 
generated with a discriminant analysis model proposed by 
Altman (1983). First discussed in Altman (1968), the
model uses a linear combination of financial ratios to 
assign a measure of financial health to each sample firm. 
As is noted by Jones (1987, 143), "the multivariate 
approach has appeal because it reduces many financial 
dimensions to a single score." Although bankruptcy 
prediction techniques have evolved in recent years, the 
Altman (1983) model possesses a combination of 
classification accuracy and availability of input data 
that makes it suitable for exploratory research such as 
this study.
A dichotomous variable (SPEC) was used to indicate 
if a firm's auditor is a specialist in the industry. 
Consistent with Palmrose (1984), an auditor was considered 
an industry specialist if its share of the industry ranked 
either first or second among auditors serving the 
industry. Information about auditor market shares by 
industry was obtained from the COMPUSTAT data base for the 
years in question.
The state in which a firm is based is revealed in 
its 10-K, as well as reference material such as Who Audits 
America. A dichotomous variable (STATE) was used to 
indicate whether the audit failure that triggered the SEC 
action against the firm's external auditor took place in 
the firm's home state. Information about the 
operationalization of the variable STATE, and the other 
variables discussed above, is provided in Table 1.
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TABLE 1 
DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES
Hypothesis
Variable Expected
Name Sign* Description
His
H2:
MOWN6
MBONUS
H3:
H4:
DEBT'
NISSUE'
H5:
H6;
SIZE'
GROWTH'
Percentage of common 
stock owned by 
management.
Dichotomous variable 
indicating the 
existence of an 
accounting-based 
compensation plan 
(l=existence, 
0=absence).
Ratio of a firm's 
total debt to its 
total assets.
Dollar amount of new 
issues of debt and 
equity in the year 
years following an 
SEC action, divided 
by assets at time of 
the action.
Total assets (total 
sales) of firm.
% change in assets 
(sales) in three 
years prior to SEC 
action.
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TABLE 1-Continued
Hypothesis
Variable
Name
Expected
Sign* Description
H9: SPECd Dichotomous variable 
indicating whether 
firm's auditor is a 
specialist in that 
firm's industry 
(l=specialist, 0=not 
specialist).
H10: STATE0 + Dichotomous variable 
indicating whether 
sample firm is 
located in the state 
where the audit 
failure that 
triggered the SEC 
action occurred.
* Expected sign is relationship between variable and 
likelihood of firm switching auditors following 
SEC action.
b Data available in firm proxy statements. 
c Data available in firm financial statements. 
d Data obtained from COMPUSTAT data base.
Sample Selection 
Actions by the SEC against auditors under Rule 2(e) 
of the SEC's Rules of Practice were used as events that 
adversely affect the credibility of an auditor. The SEC 
publishes its Rule 2(e) actions in the form of Accounting 
and Auditing Enforcement Releases (formerly Accounting 
Series Releases). The actions identified by Wilson and 
Grimlund (1990) were employed, along with a review of 
recent Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases 
(AAERs), to identify any SEC actions subsequent to that
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research. Consistent with Wilson and Grimlund (1990), 
only actions against national auditors were used. Table 2 
provides a summary of SEC Rule 2(e) actions against audit 
firms through 1986.4
TABLE 2
SUMMARY OF SEC RULE 2(e) ACTIONS AGAINST 
NATIONAL AUDIT FIRMS
Year SEC Reference Firm Name
1976 ASR #196, #196A Seidman & Seidman
1978 ASR #241 Deloitte, Haskins
& Sells
1978 ASR #248 Ernst & Whinney
1979 ASR #153A Touche Ross
1981 ASR #288 Kenneth Leventhal
1981 ASR #292 Arthur Andersen
1983 AAER #13, #16 Touche Ross
1984 AAER #45 Coopers & Lybrand
1985 AAER #57, #68 Grant Thornton
1985 AAER #78 Seidman & Seidman
Legend : ASR-— Accounting Series Release
AAER— Accounting and Auditing 
Enforcement Release
For each event, Who Audits America (WAA) and the 
COMPUSTAT data base were used to generate a sample of 
clients that had switched auditors within two years after 
an SEC action against their auditor. Firms that switched 
to an auditor that had also been the target of an SEC
4 Table 2 does not include SEC Rule 2(e) actions 
against auditors where the cited auditor merged with 
another auditor within two years of the SEC action. Also, 
Table 2 is restricted to actions against audit firms, 
rather than actions against individual members of an audit 
f irm.
action within the previous two years were not included in 
the sample. Consistent with prior research (Healy and Lys 
1986), financial service and real estate firms are 
excluded from the sample because of their markedly 
different financial characteristics. Subsidiary firms and 
firms controlled by other companies were also excluded.
To provide a basis for comparison, for each event a random 
sample of clients that did not switch auditors within the 
two year period was selected. The use of a two year 
period is consistent with the approach of Healy and Lys 
(1986) in their examination of auditor changes following 
CPA firm mergers. The two groups of sample firms were 
labeled the Switch and Non-Switch groups.
Statistical Tests 
Both univariate and multivariate statistical 
techniques were used to analyze the data. The univariate 
tests consisted of t-tests and the Chi-square test for 
independence of classification. The nonparametric Mann- 
Whitney test was employed to provide additional evidence 
about the results of the t-tests. The multivariate tests 
were conducted using a logit model. The following 
sections detail the statistical procedures performed in 
this study. A further analysis of the data is then 
described.
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Univariate Tests
Univariate tests were first employed to analyze the 
sample data. The t-test was used to test for significant 
differences in the continuous independent variables 
between the Switch and Non-Switch groups. Two underlying 
assumptions of the t-test are that the populations to be 
compared have normal distributions and that they have 
identical variances (Hays 1981, 286). As a practical 
matter, however, the conclusions reached through use of a 
t-test may not be affected by any violations of these 
assumptions for samples of moderate to large size (Hays 
1981, 287) .
To provide additional evidence about the t-test 
results, the nonparametric Mann-Whitney test was also 
conducted for the continuous independent variables. The 
Mann-Whitney test provides a nonparametric alternative to 
the t-test for the equality of means between two 
populations (Hays 1981, 587). For large samples, the 
Mann-Whitney test statistic is approximately normally 
distributed (Hays 1981, 589). The Mann-Whitney test was 
used by Chow (1982) to examine differences between two 
groups of sample firms for a series of financial 
variables.
The variables MBONUS, AUDCOM, SPEC, and STATE are 
dichotomous. The relationship between each dichotomous 
variable and the Switch and Non-Switch groups was examined
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by means of a Chi-square test for independence of 
classification. Prior studies that have used the Chi- 
square test to examine differences between groups of firms 
for a dichotomous variable include Schwartz and Menon 
(1985) and Chow (1982).
Multivariate Tests 
In addition to the univariate tests described above, 
multivariate tests were used to analyze the sample data. 
Results from the multivariate tests serve as a check on 
the univariate results (Chow 1982). A logit model was 
used. The dependent variable in the model was coded "I" 
if the firm switched auditors after an SEC action against 
its external auditor. If the firm remains with the 
auditor, the dependent variable is coded "0". Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) regression is inappropriate when the 
dependent variable is dichotomous. As is discussed by 
Aldrich and Nelson (1984), if the dependent variable is 
dichotomous, OLS estimates will lead to incorrect 
estimates of sampling variances and invalid hypothesis 
tests. Stone and Rasp (1991) note that for very small 
sample sizes (less than 100 sample items), logit model 
coefficients may be biased and OLS model coefficients may 
be slightly more efficient. The sample size in this study 
is larger than the 100 unit level discussed by Stone and 
Rasp.
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The variables described in Table 1 are the
independent variables in the logit model. The model takes
take the general form:
Y = f(MOWN, MBONUS, DEBT, NISSUE, SIZE, GROWTH,
AUDCOM, FDIST, SPEC, STATE),
where Y = 0 if the firm does not switch auditors
within two years of an SEC action against 
its auditor, and
Y = 1 if the firm does switch auditors within 
two years of an SEC action against 
its auditor.
A statistically significant coefficient for an independent 
variable is interpreted as evidence that the variable 
affects the probability that a firm will switch auditors 
following an SEC action against its external auditor.
The logit model has been widely used in prior 
research. Healy and Lys (1986) employed the model to 
analyze auditor changes following Big Eight mergers with 
non-Big Eight auditors. Palmrose (1984) also employed a 
logit model in her investigation of auditor changes by 
client firms. Williams (1988) used a logit model in an 
attempt to discover some potential determinants of auditor 
choice. The use of a logit model in the present context 
is consistent with the approach employed in previous 
studies.
Further Analysis 
To provide some insight into differences between 
clients of Big Eight auditors and clients of smaller 
auditors, the sample was broken into two subsets. One 
subset consists of client firms of Big Eight auditors. 
The other is composed of client firms of non-Big Eight 
auditors. The univariate tests and logit model are then 
be applied to each subset. Results from each subset of 
sample firms are then compared for evidence of any 
differences between the two groups.
Summary
This chapter has presented the method used in the 
study. The research questions were presented and 
hypotheses developed from agency theory and prior 
research. Sample selection and measurement of variables 
were discussed, as were the statistical techniques 
employed.
CHAPTER 4
RESULTS
The purpose of this chapter is to present the 
results of the statistical tests described in the 
preceding chapter. A description of the sample selection 
is presented first, followed by a review of the univariate 
test results. The results of the multivariate tests are 
then discussed. The chapter concludes with a further 
analysis of both univariate and multivariate results.
Sample Selection 
Annual reports, proxy statements, and Form 10-K's on 
file at the University of Texas, the University of 
Chicago, Louisiana State University, and the University of 
Southwestern Louisiana were examined for information about 
the sample firms. Other financial information was 
obtained from Moodv's Industrial Manual. Moody's Over the 
Counter Manual, and the COMPUSTAT data base. Information 
on all variables was not available for all sample firms. 
Table 3 shows the total sample size for each of the 
independent variables, as well as the number of firms for 
which all data was available. Refer to Table 1 (page 40) 
for definitions of the variables. Lower sample sizes for
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the variables MOWN, AUDCOM, and MBONUS were chiefly due to 
missing firm proxy statements.
TABLE 3
SAMPLE SIZE SUMMARY
ariable
Sample
Size
MOWN 346
MBONUS 349
DEBT 483
NISSUE 423
SIZE - Assets 483
SIZE - Sales 479
GROWTH -Assets 420
GROWTH - Sales 415
AUDCOM 351
FDIST 472
SPEC 483
STATE 483
All Variables 259
The primary cause of missing sample data was the 
unavailability of proxy statements for some firms. Many 
of the smaller firms in the sample filed proxy statements 
with the SEC irregularly during the time period examined. 
The variables most affected by missing proxy statements 
were MOWN, AUDCOM, and MBONUS. Data for all independent 
variables were available for 259 sample firms.
5 0
Univariate Results 
Univariate tests were first employed to analyze the 
data and test for significant differences between the 
Switch and Non-Switch groups for the continuous 
independent variables. Results of these tests are 
presented in Table 4. Variable means and standard 
deviations are given for both groups of client firms. The 
Switch group contains clients that changed auditors within 
two years of an SEC action against their auditor. The 
Non-Switch group consists of client firms that did not 
change auditors for the two years following an SEC action 
against their auditor. Both t-test results and Mann- 
Whitney statistics for differences between the groups are 
presented.
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TABLE 4
UNIVARIATE TEST RESULTS - CONTINUOUS VARIABLES
Switch Non-Switch Mann-Whitney
Variable________ Group____Group____ t-value_____ z-value
MOWN— mean 
(std. dev.)
0.329
(0.217)
0.259
(0.198)
3.11”** 32.32“*
DEBT 0.574
(0.433)
0.523
(0.281)
1.52 41.72*”
NISSUE 0.271
(1.595)
0.136
(0.599)
1.09* 52.61*“
SIZE— Assets 9.604
(1.764)
10.888
(2.077)
-7.34”* 49.77”*
GROWTH— Assets 0.276
(0.807)
0.189
(0.336)
1.37 54.03”*
SIZE— Sales 9.719
(2.130)
10.971
(2.377)
-6.07*” 49.49*”
GROWTH— Sales 0.336
(1.067)
0.182
(0.443)
1.83* 54.59*”
FDIST 5.479
(17.727)
6.431
(18.411)
-0.57 46.09*”
p-value < 0.10 
p-value < 0.05 
p-value < 0.01
* one tail test
The t-test results show significant differences 
between the two groups for two cf the eight variables 
examined. Contrary to expectations, clients that switched 
auditors had a higher degree of managerial ownership than 
clients in the Non-Switch group. MOWN was significant at 
the 0.01 level. Although firms that switched auditors 
were more highly leveraged than their non-switching 
counterparts, the DEBT variable was not significant at the 
0.05 level. Neither a client's future financing plans, as
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measured by NISSUE, nor its level of financial distress 
(FDIST) differed significantly between the two groups.
Both measures of SIZE were significant at the 0.01 
level. Clients that switched auditors were significantly 
smaller, both in assets and sales, than the clients in the 
Non-Switch group. The different measures of GROWTH 
yielded differing results, however. Clients that switched 
auditors tended to have faster asset and sales growth 
rates than clients that did not switch auditors. When 
GROWTH is measured in terms of total assets, the 
difference between the two groups is not statistically 
significant. The use of annual sales as a measure of 
GROWTH revealed a difference between the two groups that 
is significant at the 0.10 level.
As discussed in the preceding chapter, an underlying 
assumption of the t-test is that the populations being 
compared have normal distributions. Lack of prior 
knowledge about the normality of the distributions of the 
continuous variables led to the use of the nonparametric 
Mann-Whitney test to provide additional evidence about the 
validity of the t-test results. Results of the Mann- 
Whitney test for differences between the two groups are 
presented in Table 4.
The nonparametric test provides a strikingly 
different picture than the t-test results. All variables 
were different at the 0.01 level in the Mann-Whitney test
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results. An examination of the distribution of the 
continuous independent variables revealed a large degree 
of skewness and kurtosis for all variables, indicating a 
violation of the normality assumption. The t-test results 
may not be reliable as a result.
A factor potentially confounding the results 
presented in Table 4 is the inclusion of clients in the 
Switch group that would have changed auditors within the 
two year period irrespective of an SEC action against 
their auditor. There may be clients whose evolving 
demands for auditor credibility would lead them to switch 
from a smaller auditor to a Big Eight auditor, or vice 
versa. Inclusion of clients that have switched auditors 
because of a change in their demand for credibility in the 
same group as clients who have changed auditors as a 
result of a decline in their auditor's credibility could 
affect the results.
To partially control for this possibility, clients 
switching from a Big Eight auditor to a smaller auditor, 
or vice versa, were excluded from the Switch group. The 
clients remaining in the Switch group changed from one Big 
Eight auditor to another, or from one non-Big Eight 
auditor to another, strengthening the inference that 
differences between the Switch and Non-Switch groups are 
due to changes in auditor credibility, and not to changes 
in client demand for credibility. Differences between the
revised Switch group and the Non-Switch group were then 
tested for significance. The results are presented in 
Table 5.
Table 5
UNIVARIATE TEST RESULTS - CONTINUOUS VARIABLES
Reduced Sample
Variable
Switch
Grouo
Non-Switch 
Grouo t-value
Mann-Whitney 
z-value
MOWN— mean 
(std. dev.)
0.315
(0.208)
0.259
(0.198)
2.22” * 45.73”*
DEBT 0.576
(0.305)
0.523
(0.281)
1.74“ 56.75*“
NISSUE 0.177
(0.605)
0.136
(0.599)
0.59* 35.37“”
SIZE— Assets 9.915
(1.731)
10.888
(2.077)
-4.98”* 63.33*”
GROWTH— Assets 0.315
(0.954)
0.189
(0.336)
1.41 36.68”*
SIZE— Sales 10.114
(2.018)
10.971
(2.377)
-3.77”* 63.53“*
GROWTH— Sales 0.336
(1.177)
0.182
(0.443)
1.65* 36.66”*
FDIST 3.580
(3.897)
6.431
(18.411)
-2.37” 62.90”*
p-value < 0.10 
p-value < 0.05 
p-value < 0.01
one tail test
The results in Table 5 generally confirm the results 
for the full sample presented in Table 4. T-test
results were similar for all variables except MOWN, DEBT, 
and PDIST. The full sample results in Table 4 indicate
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that the differences between the Switch group and the Non- 
Switch group for MOWN are significant at the 0.01 level. 
The revised Switch group results are not as strong, with 
the differences for MOWN significant at the 0.05 level. 
DEBT, insignificant in the full sample, was significant at 
the 0.10 level in Table 5.
The full sample t-test results in Table 4 showed no 
significant difference between the two groups' level of 
financial distress, as measured by FDIST. When the 
revised Switch group is compared to the Non-Switch group, 
the t-test results are significant at the 0.05 level. As 
in Table 4, the nonparametric Mann-Whitney test results 
are significant at the 0.01 level for all variables, 
indicating that the t-test results are affected by the 
lack of normality.
Dichotomous independent variables were tested using 
the Chi-square test for independence of classification.
The results of this test are presented in Table 6. As 
indicated in Table 6, MBONUS and STATE had no significant 
influence on the tendency of a sample firm to switch 
auditors following an SEC action. As expected, clients of 
auditors who were specialists in their industry (SPEC) 
were significantly less likely to switch auditors. 
Surprisingly, firms with a corporate audit committee 
(AUDCOM) were less likely to switch auditors than firms 
without an audit committee. As with the continuous
variables, the tests were conducted again using a revised 
Switch group that excluded client firms which had changed
their level of auditor following an SEC 
difference in the results was found.
action. No
TABLE 6
CHI-SQUARE TEST OF DICHOTOMOUS VARIABLES
STATE In-State Out of State Totals
Switch 37 185 
Non-Switch 35 226
222
261
Totals 72 411 483
Chi-Square (1 d.f.) = 1.003 
p-value = 0.316
SPEC Specialist Non-Soecialist Totals
Switch 42 180 
Non-Switch 80 181
222
261
Totals 122 361 483
Chi-Square (1 d.f.) = 8.746 
p-value = 0.003
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TABLE 6-Continued
AUDCOM Committee No Committee Totals
Switch 86 73 159
Non-Switch 145 47 192
Totals 231 120 351
Chi-Square (1 d.f.) = 17.757
p-value < 0.001
MBONUS Bonus Plan No Bonus Plan Totals
Switch 71 88 159
Non-Switch 95 95 190
Totals 166 183 349
Chi-Square (1 d.f.) = 0.991
p-value = 0. 319
To provide additional insight into these results, 
simple Pearson correlations among the independent 
variables were calculated. The correlations are presented 
in Table 7. The results reveal several significant 
correlations among the independent variables. For example 
SIZE was highly correlated with SPEC, AUDCOM, MBONUS,
MOWN, NISSUE, and FDIST. A large number of significant 
correlations were also observed when client sales was used 
as the measure of SIZE and GROWTH. Similar results were 
obtained when clients changing their level of external 
auditor were deleted from the Switch group.
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TABLE 7
S IM P L E  PEA RSO N  C O R REL A TIO N  C O E F F I C I E N T S
ST A T E S P E C AUDCOM MBONUS S I Z E a
ST A T E 1 . 0 0 0
S P E C - 0 . 0 5 6 1 . 0 0 0
AUDCOM - 0 . 0 3 2 0 .0 6 5 1 . 0 0 0
MBONUS - 0 . 0 2 7 - 0 . 0 4 3 0.126** 1 . 0 0 0
S I Z E 1 - 0 . 0 5 3 0.247*** 0 .4 9 8 "* 0 .2 3 9 * " 1 . 0 0 0
GROWTH1 - 0 . 0 1 0 -0 .0 8 2 * - 0 . 0 2 6 - 0 . 0 4 2 - 0 . 0 6 0
MOWN 0 . 0 8 5 - 0 . 0 6 3 - 0 .3 4 6 * " - 0 . 1 2 5 " - 0 .4 3 9 " *
N I S S U E - 0 . 0 3 7 - 0 . 0 2 3 - 0 .0 9 5 * - 0 . 0 2 4 - 0 .1 5 4 * "
DEBT 0 . 0 0 1 - 0 . 0 5 0 - 0 . 0 7 7 0 . 0 6 1 - 0 . 0 4 3
F D I S T - 0 . 0 3 7 0 .0 0 9 - 0 .0 9 9 * - 0 . 0 8 5 - 0 .1 4 0 * "
GROWTH MOWN N IS S U E DEBT F D I S T
GROWTH 1 . 0 0 0
MOWN 0 .1 0 5 * 1 . 0 0 0
N I S S U E 0 . 0 2 7 0 . 0 6 8 1 . 0 0 0
DEBT - 0 . 0 5 8 0 .0 1 9 0 .5 6 2 1 . 0 0 0
F D I S T 0 .1 5 9 * " 0 . 0 5 5 0 .2 2 1 " " - 0 . 1 1 0 " * 1 . 0 0 0
p - v a l u e  < 0 . 1 0  
"  p - v a l u e  < 0 . 0 5  
*" p - v a l u e  < 0 . 0 1  
* a s  m e a s u r e d  i n  a s s e t s
The large number of highly correlated independent 
variables calls into question the overall significance of 
the univariate test results. Observed differences in 
independent variables may be due to differences in 
reaction to an SEC action, or simply due to correlation 
with another variable for which such differences exist.
The significance at or below the 0.10 level of 16 of the 
45 correlations in Table 7 indicates the need for further 
analysis of the data using a multivariate approach. This 
approach is presented in the following section.
Multivariate Results 
A logit model was formulated to further investigate 
the univariate results. The model employed total assets as 
a measure of firm size (SIZE) and rate of growth (GROWTH). 
Results of the logit model are presented in Table 8. The 
model results were unchanged by use of annual sales as a 
measure of SIZE and GROWTH. As a consequence, those 
results are not shown.
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TABLE 8 
LOGIT MODEL RESULTS
Hypothesis Variable Coefficient
Parameter
Chi-Square P--value
HI MOWN -0.533 0.43 0.51
H2 MBONUS 0.071 0.06 0.80
H3 DEBT -0.217 0.12 0.73
H4 NISSUE 0.233 0.33 0.56
H5 SIZE4 -0.409 17.86 < 0.01
H6 GROWTH4 0.290 0.93 0.33
H7 AUDCOM -0.393 1.33 0.24
H8 FDIST -0.005 0.76 0.38
H9 SPEC -0.362 1.16 0.28
H10 STATE 0.573 2.12 0.14
Intercept 4.597 15.49 < 0.01
Model Chi-Square 42.36 < 0.01
a as measured in assets
As seen in Table 8, the coefficients for most of the 
independent variables are not significant. Firm size is 
the only variable with a significant coefficient (p-value 
< 0.01). Removal of clients changing the level of their 
auditor from the Switch group did not affect the results.
Despite the lack of significance of most of the 
coefficients, the model as a whole was statistically 
significant (p-value < 0.01). In view of the overall 
significance of the logit model, the lack of significance 
of the individual coefficients suggests that the 
correlations among the independent variables are strong 
enough to distort the results. If the independent 
variables are highly correlated, Berenson, Levine, and 
Goldstein (1983, 414) note:
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. . .  it is difficult if not impossible to assess the 
unique effects individual explanatory variables have 
upon the response variable.
Given the unreliability of the logit model's 
coefficients due to the presence of multicollinearity, a 
stepwise logit procedure was employed to provide a clearer 
picture of the contribution of individual independent 
variables to the model. Under this procedure, also 
adopted by Williams (1988), individual variables were 
added to the model and retained only if they were 
significant at the 0.05 level. The results of the 
stepwise logit procedure were identical to the full model 
results. The only significant independent variable was 
SIZE, as measured in either sales or assets.
The results of the multivariate logit analysis 
suggest that most observed differences in the univariate 
test results were attributable to high levels of 
correlation among the independent variables. The only 
variable for which a significant result was consistently 
found was SIZE. The results indicate that smaller firms 
are more likely to switch auditors following an SEC action 
against their external auditor than are larger firms.
Further Analysis
One of the objectives of the study is to examine 
differences between clients of Big Eight auditors and 
clients of smaller audit firms. To that end, the
univariate and multivariate procedures described above are 
applied to each type of client. The clients of Big Eight 
auditors are discussed first.
As before, both t-tests and the Mann-Whitney test 
were used to examine the continuous independent variables 
for differences between the Switch and Non-Switch groups. 
The results of this univariate analysis are presented in 
Table 9.
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TABLE 9
UNIVARIATE TEST RESULTS - CONTINUOUS VARIABLES 
Clients of Big Eight Auditors
Variable
Switch
Grouo
Non-Switch
Grouo
Mann-Whitney 
t-value z-value
MOWN— mean 
(std. dev.)
0.321
(0.218)
0.227
(0.180)
3.69**** 3.50***
DEBT 0.588
(0.461)
0.506
(0.202)
2.16** 61.72***
NISSUE 0.309
(1.770)
0.137
(0.634)
1.13* 36.59***
SIZE— Assets 9.812
(1.680)
11.326
(1.974)
-7.98*** 70.68***
GROWTH— Assets 0.267
(0.864)
0.182
(0.293)
1.15 38.99***
SIZE— Sales 10.014
(2.029)
11.485
(2.139)
-6.76*** 70.60***
GROWTH— Sales 0.338
(1.071)
0.149
(0.240)
2.12** 37.30***
FDIST 5.649
(19.625)
6.360
(18.980)
-0.34 67.46***-
p-value < 0.10 
p-value < 0.05 
p-value < 0.01
* one tail test
As was the case with the full sample of clients 
(Table 4), the Mann-Whitney test results indicate 
significant differences between the two groups for all 
variables. The t-test results for Big Eight clients are 
also similar to those of the full sample, with the 
exception of DEBT. Not significant for the sample as a 
whole, the t-statistic for DEBT is significant at the 0.05 
level for Big Eight clients.
The sample of Big Eight clients discussed in Table 
9, includes clients that switched from a Big Eight auditor 
to a smaller audit firm. Consistent with the earlier 
analysis, these clients were deleted from the sample to 
partially control for auditor switches due to a change in 
a client's demand for credible auditing. The results 
(not presented) confirm those reported in Table 9, with 
the exception of FDIST. As reported in Table 9, the t- 
statistic for FDIST was not significant. When the Switch 
group is restricted to clients that switched from one Big 
Eight auditor to another, the t-statistic for FDIST 
increases to 2.10 (p-value = 0.03).
Differences between the groups for the dichotomous 
independent variables were tested using the Chi-Square 
test. Results for clients of Big Eight auditors are 
presented in Table 10. The results are similar to those 
for the sample as a whole. The clients of an industry 
specialist were less likely to leave their auditor than 
other clients. Client firms with audit committees were 
less likely to switch auditors than firms without such 
committees. The results were unchanged when the Switch 
group was restricted to clients that switched from one Big 
Eight auditor to another.
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TABLE 10
CHI-SQUARE TEST OF DICHOTOMOUS VARIABLES 
Clients of Big Eight Auditors
STATE In-State Out of State Totals
Switch 25 145 170
Non-Switch 25 177 202
Totals 50 322 372
Chi-Square (1 d.f.) = 0.430
p-value = 0.511
SPEC Specialist Non-Specialist Totals
Switch 42 128 170
Non-Switch 80 122 202
Totals 122 250 372
Chi-Square (1 d.f.) = 9.296
p-value = 0.002
AUDCOM Committee No Committee Totals
Switch 69 50 119
Non-Switch 124 25 149
Totals 193 75 268
Chi-Square (1 d.f.) = 20.910
p-value < 0.001
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TABLE 10-Continued
MB ONUS Bonus Plan No Bonus Plan_____ Totals
Switch 58 58 116
Non-Switch 75 68 143
Totals 133 126 259
Chi-Square (1 d.f.) = 0.153
p-value = 0.695
The univariate results for clients of Big Eight 
auditors only were similar to those for the sample as a 
whole. To provide further insight into the results, a 
logit model was estimated for the clients of Big Eight 
auditors only. Results are presented in Table 11.
TABLE 11
LOGIT MODEL RESULTS 
Clients of Big Eight Auditors
Hypothesis Variable Coefficient
Parameter
Chi-Square P--value
HI MOWN -0.007 0.01 0.93
H2 MBONUS 0.253 0.55 0.45
H3 DEBT 0.437 0.36 0.55
H4 NISSUE 0.381 0.43 0.51
H5 SIZE* -0.531 20.16 < 0.01
H6 GROWTH* 0.266 0.72 0.39
H7 AUDCOM -0.748 3.48 0.06
H8 FDIST -0.002 0.54 0.46
H9 SPEC -0.446 1.47 0.22
H10 STATE 0.387 0.70 0.40
Intercept 5.582 16.32 < 0.01
Model Chi-Square 
* as measured in assets
53.56 < 0.01
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As was the case for the full sample (Table 8), the 
only independent variable significant at the 0.05 level is 
SIZE. The most striking difference noted in Table 11 is 
the increase in significance of the variable AUDCOM. The 
coefficient of AUDCOM for the sample as a whole had a p- 
value of 0.24. The results in Table 12 show a p-value
for AUDCOM of 0.06. The results reported in Table 11 
employ the asset-based measures of SIZE and GROWTH. No 
significant differences were noted when the sales-based 
measures were used.5
Concerns about multicollinearity call into question 
the reliability of individual coefficients in the logit 
model. To gain more insight into the contribution of each 
independent variable, a stepwise logit procedure was 
employed. Variables were added to the logit model 
individually and retained if their coefficients were 
significant at the 0.05 level. Stepwise logit results are 
presented in Table 12.
5 As a further analysis, the Switch group was 
restricted to clients that changed from one Big Eight 
auditor to another. Logit model results using the asset- 
based measures of SIZE and GROWTH were not noticeably 
different from the results reported in Table 11. When the 
sales-based measures of SIZE and GROWTH were used for this 
reduced Switch group, the variable AUDCOM had a 
coefficient with a p-value of 0.11.
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TABLE 12
STEPWISE LOGIT RESULTS— CLIENTS OF BIG EIGHT AUDITORS
Variable Coefficient
Parameter 
Chi-Square P-■Value
Asset-Based Measures of SIZE and GROWTH
SIZE -0.581 
Intercept 5.813
30.98
27.38
<
<
0.01
0.01
Model Chi-Square 42.60 < 0. 01
Sales-Based Measures of SIZE and GROWTH
SIZE -0.420 
GROWTH 0.730 
AUDCOM -0.753
18.20
2.88
4.26
< 0.01
0.08
0.03
Model Chi-Square 43.78 < 0.02.
The first section of Table 12 presents the results 
of the stepwise logit model when total assets are used as 
a measure of SIZE. The results are consistent with the 
prior logit models reported. The only independent 
variable with a significant coefficient is SIZE. The 
results are quite different when annual sales is used as a 
measure of SIZE and GROWTH. As is reported in the second 
section of Table 12, both GROWTH and AUDCOM met the 0.05 
significance level necessary to be retained in the model.6 
Faster growing firms were more likely to switch auditors 
after an SEC action against their auditor. Firms with
6 Variables had to be significant at the 0.05 
significance level to be retained in the model. Once 
included in the model, the level of their coefficients is 
affected by the degree of correlation with other variables 
in the model.
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audit committees were less likely to switch than firms 
without committees.7
The analysis in Table 12 was repeated with the 
Switch group restricted to clients that had switched from 
one Big Eight auditor to another. No differences were 
noted for the asset-based model. When annual sales was 
used as a measure of SIZE and GROWTH, the variables SIZE 
and GROWTH were significant for the reduced Switch group. 
AUDCOM, however, was not significant. When the model was 
estimated with a 0.10 level of significance required for a 
variable to be retained in the model, AUDCOM had a 
significant coefficient, as did SIZE and GROWTH.
The multivariate analysis indicates differences 
between clients of Big Eight auditors and the sample as a 
whole. In particular, the variables AUDCOM and GROWTH (as 
measured by sales) are considerably more significant for 
Big Eight clients than for all clients. An examination of 
clients of smaller auditors follows.
For this phase of the analysis, the Switch group was 
restricted to clients of non-Big Eight auditors. The 
continuous independent variables were examined for 
differences between the Switch and Non-Switch groups.
7 When the stepwise logit model employing the asset- 
based measures of SIZE and GROWTH was run using a 0.10 
significance level required for a variable to remain in 
the model, AUDCOM was significant (p-value 0.06) and was 
retained in the model. GROWTH in assets was not 
significant.
7 0
Univariate test results for the continuous independent 
variables are presented in Table 13.
TABLE 13
UNIVARIATE RESULTS - CONTINUOUS VARIABLES 
Clients of Non-Big Eight Auditors
Variable
Switch
Group
Non-Switch
Group t-value
Mann-Whitney 
z-value
MOWN— mean 0.351 0.355 “0.07* 0.07
(std. dev.) (0.214) (0.219)
DEBT 0.528 0.581 -0.70 0.62
(0.322) (0.457)
NISSUE 0.112 0.132 -0.25“ 0.77
(0.288) (0.425)
SIZE— Assets 8.923 9.388 -1.36 1.75*
(1.875) (1.969)
GROWTH— Assets 0.308 0.218 -0.80 0.68
(0.548) (0.470)
SIZE— Sales 8.736 9.240 1.16 1.36
(2.183) (2.338)
GROWTH— Sales 0.329 0.318 0.04 0.47
(1.068) (0.871)
FDIST 4.918 6.670 -0.69 0.43
(9.053) (16.514)
p-value < 0.10
* one tail test
The results in Table 13 are characterized by a lack 
of significant differences for almost all variables. Only 
the asset-based measure of firm size is marginally 
significant (p-value = 0.08) using the Mann-Whitney test 
statistic. The weak results for SIZE are especially 
surprising given the consistency with which significant 
results have been found in the earlier analyses. To 
further investigate the results in Table 13, the Switch 
sample was restricted to clients that had changed from one
non-Big Eight auditor to another. As noted earlier, this 
procedure serves as a partial control for firms changing 
auditors in response to their own evolving needs for 
credibility, rather than in response to a change in the 
credibility of their current auditors. The results of 
this procedure are presented in Table 14.
TABLE 14
UNIVARIATE TEST RESULTS - CONTINUOUS VARIABLES 
Clients of Non-Big Eight Auditors 
Reduced Sample
Variable
Switch
Grouo
Non-Switch
Grouo t-value
Mann-Wh itney 
z-value
MOWN— mean 
(std. dev.)
0.391
(0.218)
0.355
(0.219)
0.49“ 0.53
DEBT 0.531
(0.393)
0.581
(0.457)
-0.41 0.45
NISSUE 0.000
(0.000)
0.132
(0.430)
-1.36‘ 0.69
SIZE— Assets 7.861
(1.095)
9.388
(1.969)
-4.37*** 3.59***
GROWTH— Assets 0.489
(0.835)
0.218
(0.470)
1.09 0.01
SIZE— Sales 7.566
(1.374)
9.240
(2.338)
-3.59*** 3.10***
GROWTH— Sales 0.489
(1.711)
0.318
(0.871)
0.29 1.05
FDIST 4.632
(7.507)
6.670
(16.514)
-0.75 0.48
p-value < 0.10 
p-value < 0.05 
p-value < 0.01
one tail test
When clients that switched from a smaller auditor to
a Big Eight auditor are excluded from the Switch group,
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the SIZE variable is significant for both measures of the 
variable. As was the case with the full sample of clients 
of smaller auditors, no other significant differences were 
noted.
The dichotomous independent variables were analyzed 
using the Chi-Square test for independence of 
classification. The industry specialization variable 
(SPEC) was not included in the analysis because non-Big 
Eight firms were not large enough to specialize. Table 15 
presents the results of the Chi-Square tests.
TABLE 15
CHI-SQUARE TEST OF DICHOTOMOUS VARIABLES 
Clients of Non-Big Eight Auditors
STATE In-State Out of State Totals
Switch 12 40 52
Non-Switch 10 49 59
Totals 22 89 111
Chi-Square (1 d.f.) = 0.653
p-value = 0.419
AUDCOM Committee No Committee Totals
Switch 17 23 40
Non-Switch 21 22 43
Totals 38 45 83
Chi-Square (1 d.f.) = 0.335 
p-value = 0.562
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TABLE 15-Continued
MBONUS Bonus Plan No Bonus Plan Totals
Switch 13 30 43
Non-Switch 20 27 47
Totals 33 57 90
Chi-Square (ld.f.) = 1.467
p-value = 0.225
As for the sample as a whole, and for the. sample of 
clients of Big Eight firms, STATE was not a significant 
variable influencing the change in auditors. The 
existence of an audit committee, which was highly 
significant for the full sample was not a significant 
factor in Table 15. Consistent with prior results, MBONUS 
was not significant. When clients that switched from a 
smaller auditor to a Big Eight auditor were deleted from 
the Switch group, the results were unchanged for MBONUS 
and STATE. The reduced Switch group did affect the 
significance of the variable AUDCOM, however. The results 
for this variable are presented in Table 16.
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TABLE 16
CHI-SQUARE TEST OF DICHOTOMOUS VARIABLES 
Clients of Non-Big Eight Auditors 
Reduced Sample
AUDCOM Committee No Committee Totals
Switch 1 13 14
Non-Switch 20 22 42
Totals 21 35 56
Chi-Square (1 d.f.) = 7.339 
p-value = 0.006
As is shown in Table 16, firms with audit committees 
were significantly less likely to switch auditors than 
firms without such committees. The significance of AUDCOM 
is consistent with the Chi-Square results observed for the 
sample as a whole, and for clients of Big Eight firms.
A logit model was estimated for the clients of 
smaller auditors. The absence of industry specialists 
among non-Big Eight auditors necessitated the deletion of 
the variable SPEC from the model. Results are presented 
in Table 17 for the model using the asset-based measures 
of SIZE and GROWTH.
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TABLE 17
LOGIT MODEL RESULTS-CLIENTS OF NON-BIG EIGHT
AUDITORS
Hypothesis Variable Coefficient
Parameter
Chi-Square p-value
HI MOWN -2.103 1.18 0.27
H2 MBONUS -1.730 4.56 0.03
H3 DEBT -2.550 1.52 0.21
H4 NISSUE -0.027 0.00 0.97
H5 SIZE* -0.107 0.22 0.64
H6 GROWTH* 1.361 0.74 0.38
H7 AUDCOM 0.472 0.37 0.54
H8 FDIST -0.243 2.23 0.13
H10 STATE 1.583 2.08 0.14
Intercept 3.552 1.42 0.23
Model Chi-Square 11.72 0.22
* as measured in assets
The logit results for clients of smaller auditors 
are quite different from the results of the previous 
models. The coefficient of SIZE, as measured by assets, is 
not significant. The coefficient of MBONUS is significant 
(p-value = 0.03) and negatively related to the probability 
of a firm switching auditors after an SEC action. The 
variables STATE and FDIST, while not significant at 
traditional levels of significance, have much lower p- 
values than in previous models. When the sales-based 
measures of SIZE and GROWTH are used in the logit model, 
the differences from prior results is even more striking. 
Table 18 presents the results for this formulation of the 
logit model.
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TABLE 18
LOGIT MODEL RESULTS-CLIENTS OF NON-BIG EIGHT
AUDITORS
Sales-based Measures of SIZE and GROWTH
Hypothesis Variable Coefficient
Parameter
Chi-Square p-value
HI MOWN -0.872 0.18 0.67
H2 MBONUS -2.040 5.36 0.02
H3 DEBT -5.446 3.85 0.04
H4 NISSUE -0.271 0.09 0.76
H5 SIZE* -0.029 0.02 0.88
H6 GROWTH* 1.466 3.99 0.04
H7 AUDCOM 0.492 0.35 0.55
H8 FDIST -0.543 5.03 0.02
H10 STATE 1.181 1.02 0.31
Intercept 4.382 2.54 0.11
Model Chi-Square 14.36 0.11
* as measured in sales
The sales-based measure of GROWTH is significant (p- 
value = 0.04), while the asset-based measure of GROWTH has 
a p-value of 0.38. Use of a different measure of SIZE and 
GROWTH also affected the significance of the coefficients 
of FDIST and DEBT. Neither was significant in the asset- 
based model reported in Table 17. Both were significant 
in the sales-based model reported in Table 18. MBONUS had 
a significant coefficient in both models.
Because of the difficulties in interpreting the 
individual coefficients of the variables created by 
correlations among the independent variables, a stepwise 
logit model was employed. As before, individual variables 
were added to the model and retained if a significance
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level of 0.05 was met. The results of the stepwise
procedure
STEPWISE
are reported in Table 19.
TABLE 19
LOGIT RESULTS— CLIENTS OF NON-BIG EIGHT AUDITORS
Parameter
Variable Coefficient Chi-Square P-Value
Asset-Based Measures of SIZE and GROWTH
MBONUS -1.303 3.76 0.05
Intercept 0.125 0.12 0.72
Model Chi-•Square 4.14 0.04
Sales-Based Measures of SIZE and GROWTH
MBONUS -1.317 3.85 0.04
Intercept 0.064 0.03 0.85
Model Chi-•Square 4.25 0. 03
The results for the asset-based stepwise logit model 
reported in Panel A of Table 19 are similar to those of 
the model as a whole as reported in Table 17. The results 
for the sales-based stepwise logit model are quite 
different from those reported for the full model in Table
18. The variables FDIST, GROWTH, and DEBT, all
significant in the full model did not meet the 0.05
significance level required for a variable to be retained
in the model. When the Switch group is restricted to 
clients that did not change to a Big Eight auditor, AUDCOM 
is significant at the 0.05 level (results not presented).
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Results of Hypothesis Tests
The results of the univariate and multivariate 
tests, taken together, allow conclusions to be drawn about 
the research hypotheses. The results were characterized 
by a divergence between t-test results and results of the 
nonparametric Mann-Whitney test. The high degrees of 
skewness and kurtosis in the variables1 distributions 
provide an explanation for this difference. The 
independent variables are highly correlated, suggesting 
that the individual coefficients of the logit models are 
unreliable indicators of a variable's significance. The 
correlations also provide an explanation for the 
divergence between the univariate and multivariate 
results.
The first hypothesis was that the smaller 
management's ownership of the firm (MOWN), the higher the 
probability that the firm would switch auditors following 
an SEC action against the firm's auditor. For the sample 
as a whole the univariate test results revealed a 
significant difference in the level of management 
ownership between the Switch and Non-Switch groups. 
Surprisingly, clients switching auditors had higher levels 
of management ownership than clients that did not switch. 
However, the logit model results indicated that MOWN was 
not a significant variable, suggesting that the observed 
differences in MOWN were due to that variable's high
degree of correlation with other factors, such as SIZE, 
rather than to the influence of MOWN itself. The same 
pattern was found when the sample was restricted to 
clients of Big Eight auditors. When clients of Big Eight 
auditors were examined separately, MOWN was not 
significant in either the univariate or multivariate 
tests. Taken as a whole, the results do not support the 
first hypothesis.
The second hypothesis was that firms with 
accounting-based management compensation plans (MBONUS) 
were more likely to switch auditors than firms without 
such plans. Chi-square and logit results were 
consistently not significant for the full sample and 
clients of Big Eight auditors. When the sample of clients 
of non-Big Eight auditors was examined, MBONUS had a 
significant coefficient in the full logit model. The sign 
of the coefficient was opposite the predicted sign, 
however. This result was supported by a stepwise logit 
procedure, in which MBONUS met the significance level 
required for it to be retained in the model. The results 
indicate that, for clients of smaller auditors, the 
existence of an accounting-based bonus plan does affect 
the likelihood of a firm switching auditors after an SEC 
action against their external auditor. Because of the 
sign of the observed relationship, however, the second 
hypothesis is not supported by the evidence.
A firm's debt position was addressed by the third 
hypothesis, which held that firms switching auditors would 
have a significantly different degree of leverage (DEBT) 
than firms that did not switch auditors. Nonparametric 
test results showed that firms in the Switch group were 
significantly more highly leveraged than firms in the Non- 
Switch group. Results of logit analysis, however, 
indicated that DEBT did not significantly affect the 
probability of a firm switching auditors. As was noted 
with MOWN, the correlation of DEBT and SIZE may explain 
the divergence between the univariate and multivariate 
results. For the sample as a whole, and for clients of 
Big Eight auditors, the results do not support the third 
hypothesis. When the clients of smaller auditors were 
examined separately, the univariate test results showed no 
differences in leverage between the Switch and Non-Switch 
groups. The logit model using the sales-based measure of 
SIZE and GROWTH contained a significant coefficient for 
DEBT, but the results were not supported by the stepwise 
logit procedure. Given the unreliability of individual 
coefficients due to correlation among the independent 
variables, the significance of DEBT in one model does not 
constitute strong evidence in support of the third 
hypothesis.
The fourth hypothesis holds that a firm planning to 
raise debt or equity in the capital markets (NISSUE) would
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be more likely to change auditors than a firm without such 
financing plans. As with all the continuous variables, 
the Mann-Whitney test indicated a significant difference 
between the Switch and Non-Switch groups. This result was 
not supported by the multivariate analysis, however.
Taken together, the results do not support the fourth 
hypothesis.
The fifth and sixth hypotheses held that the Switch 
and Non-Switch groups would differ in firm size and rate 
of growth. Two measures of size were employed— total 
assets and annual sales. Three year growth rates were 
calculated using both measures. For the sample as a whole 
and for the clients of Big Eight auditors, the results 
consistently showed that clients in the Switch group were 
significantly smaller than clients in the Non-Switch 
group. However, clients of smaller auditors did not 
significantly differ in SIZE between the two groups. With 
that exception, the evidence supports the fifth 
hypothesis.
The significance of the variable GROWTH depended on 
the measure used to calculate a firm's rate of growth.
The full model Mann-Whitney test statistics indicated that 
firms switching auditors were growing at a faster rate 
than firms in the Non-Switch group. Results of the logit 
model did not support this conclusion. When the clients 
of Big Eight auditors were examined separately, the
stepwise logit procedure revealed that the coefficient of 
GROWTH as measured by sales was significant, while the 
asset-based measure of GROWTH was not. The univariate 
test results for clients of smaller auditors revealed no 
differences in growth rates between the Switch and non- 
Switch groups. The logit model indicated a significant 
coefficient for the sales-based measure of GROWTH, but not 
for the asset-based measure. Stepwise logit results for 
the clients of non-Big Eight auditors failed to show a 
significant result for either measure of GROWTH. The 
evidence fails to strongly support the sixth hypothesis.
Prior research had suggested that firms with 
corporate audit committees (AUDCOM) were more likely to 
change auditors than firms without such committees. Chi- 
square results indicated that the reverse relationship 
existed. Logit results for the clients of Big Eight 
auditors also indicated that AUDCOM was significant. When 
the sales-based stepwise logit model was employed, AUDCOM 
was significant at the 0.05 significance level. Chi- 
square results indicated that the existence of a corporate 
audit committee affected the probability of a client of a 
smaller audit firm switching auditors. Results of the 
stepwise logit procedure for a sample of firms that had 
switched from one non-Big Eight auditor to another 
supported this finding. Because the direction of the
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relationship is opposite that predicted, the evidence does 
not support the seventh hypothesis.
The eighth hypothesis postulated that firms of 
differing degrees of financial health would respond 
differently to changes in external auditor credibility. 
FDIST was significantly correlated with SIZE, GROWTH, 
NISSUE, and DEBT. Although the univariate nonparametric 
tests indicated significant differences between the Switch 
and Non-Switch groups, the logit model results did not 
consistently support this finding. The evidence does not 
appear to support the eighth hypothesis.
The ninth hypothesis held that firms would be less 
likely to terminate a relationship with an auditor that 
was a specialist in the firm's industry. Chi-square tests 
supported this hypothesis, but the logit results 
consistently failed to show significance for the variable 
SPEC. The divergence in results may attributable to 
SPEC's significant (p-value 0.01) correlation with SIZE.
The final independent variable focused on the 
geographical component of credibility. The tenth 
hypothesis was that a firm would be more likely to change 
auditors if the SEC action dealt with an audit failure in 
that firm's state. No evidence was found to support this 
hypothesis. Table 20 provides a summary of the results of 
the hypothesis tests.
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TABLE 20
SUMMARY OF HYPOTHESIS TESTS
Variable Description Result
HI MOWN Management Ownership Not Significant
H2 MBONUS Bonus Plan Significant*
H3 DEBT Firm Leverage Not Significant
H4 NISSUE New Issues of Equity/Debt Not Significant
H5 SIZE Firm Size Significant
H6 GROWTH Three Year Rate of Growth Not Significantb
H7 AUDCOM Audit Committee Significant'
H8 FDIST Financial Health Not Significant
H9 SPEC Industry Specialist Not Significant
H10 STATE Location of Client Firm Not Sianificant
* Significant for clients of non-Big Eight auditors with 
sign opposite of that expected.
b Significant for clients of Big Eight auditors when 
measured in sales.
c Significant with sign opposite of that expected.
Summary
This chapter has presented the results of the 
univariate and multivariate tests. Results were discussed 
for the sample as a whole, and then separately for clients 
of Big Eight auditors and clients of smaller auditors.
The following chapter will provide a discussion and 
interpretation of these results. Implications of the 
findings and suggestions for future research will be 
presented, along with a discussion of some limitations of 
this study.
CHAPTER 5
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This chapter will summarize and discuss the results 
presented in the previous chapter. The implications of 
those results will be presented, followed by a discussion 
of some of the limitations of this study. The final 
section of the chapter will present some suggestions for 
future research.
Summary of Results and Implications 
The single most significant variable in the sample 
as a whole was SIZE. In the sample as a whole and for 
clients of Big Eight auditors, firms in the Switch group 
were significantly smaller than firms in the Non-Switch 
group. The results seem to support the view that the 
demand for a credible auditor is a function of the amount 
of information available about the firm. As noted by 
Wilson and Grimlund (1990), financial statements make up a 
larger portion of a small firm's information set, and thus 
the credibility of those financial statements may be a 
more important consideration than it would be for a larger 
firm.
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When the clients of Big Eight auditors and clients 
of smaller auditors were examined separately, several 
differences emerged. While firm size was also an 
important variable for clients of Big Eight auditors, it 
was not significant for the clients of smaller auditors. 
Among clients of Big Eight firms, firms with faster rates 
of sales growth were more likely to switch auditors.
Strong evidence of such a trend among clients of smaller 
auditors was not found.
Clients of Big Eight auditors with corporate audit 
committees were significantly less likely to switch 
auditors after an SEC action against their auditor than 
firms without such committees. For clients of smaller 
auditors, the existence of an audit committee seemed to be 
a significant factor only for those firms switching from 
one non-Big Eight auditor to another. This result appears 
to be inconsistent with the findings of Lynn (1985) , whose 
survey of firms revealed auditor prestige to be more 
important to firms with audit committees.
Two factors may explain the reluctance of firms with 
audit committees to switch auditors. First, the existence 
of an audit committee may create another layer of 
bureaucracy within the corporation. Additional 
evaluations and discussions at another decision making 
level within the firm may make it more difficult for firms 
to change auditors in response to a single event, such as
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an SEC Rule 2(e) action against the firm's auditor. Firms 
without such committees may find the decision making 
process more "streamlined," and thus switch auditors more 
easily.
A second explanation for firms with audit committees 
being less likely to switch auditors affected by SEC 
actions may be the role of the committee in the auditor 
selection process. An independent audit committee may be 
able to more carefully evaluate the firm's auditors. The 
increased level of scrutiny may cause the audit committee 
to be influenced less by events not directly involving the 
firm, such as SEC actions against the firm's auditor.
The existence of an accounting-based bonus plan was 
not a significant factor in the analysis of clients of Big 
Eight auditors. This was the single most significant 
variable for clients of smaller auditors, however. Among 
this sample subset, firms with a bonus plan were less 
likely to switch auditors than firms without such a plan. 
This finding is contrary to the hypothesized relationship.
The other variables hypothesized to have an impact 
on the probability of a firm switching auditors were not 
consistently significant. This was true for variables 
suggested by agency theory (MOWN, NISSUE, DEBT) and 
variables suggested by prior research (FDIST, SPEC,
STATE). No differences were noted between the Switch and 
Non-Switch groups for these variables..
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Perhaps the most compelling result is the apparent 
failure of agency theory to correctly predict the observed 
relationships. The results for SIZE and MBONUS were 
contrary to what would have been expected under agency 
theory. Other agency theory derived variables (MOWN’, 
NISSUE, DEBT) were not significant in this study.
Although agency theory has been used to analyze firms 
changing auditors due to their evolving needs for auditor 
credibility, its predictions have yielded mixed results.
An example of the predictive ability of agency 
theory in the auditor choice literature is the level of 
management ownership of the firm. Agency theory predicts 
that firms with higher levels of management ownership have 
less need for credible auditing (Francis and Wilson 1988). 
Palmrose (1984) tested the degree of management ownership 
as a factor affecting the probability that a firm 
switching auditors would select a Big Eight auditor. No 
significant result was found. Similar results were 
reported by Francis and Wilson (1988). Eichenseher and 
Shields (1989) found management ownership positively 
associated with the switch to a Big Eight auditor, a 
result contrary to their prediction derived from agency 
theory.
Although Francis and Wilson (1988) found that 
changes in some agency cost derived variables were 
significant in predicting auditor choice, the results of
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this study and others indicate that agency theory does
fully capture the factors affecting a firm's selection of
an auditor. As Francis and Wilson (1988, 680) note:
While agency costs appear, at the margin, to affect 
auditor choice above and beyond client size/growth, 
the auditor selection process seems to be more complex 
than modelled in this and related studies.
The SEC has been criticised for its approach to 
disciplinary actions against auditors under Rule 2(e). 
Business Week (1984, 132) noted the perception that 
". . . such an action has a disproportionate effect on 
smaller firms . . . ." The SEC may be subject to this 
criticism because of its lack of knowledge about the 
impact of its actions on audit firms. The results of this 
study should provide the SEC with information about the 
consequences of a Rule 2(e) action against an auditor.
The knowledge that different factors affect the response 
of clients of Big Eight firms and clients of smaller 
auditors should allow the SEC to more fully assess the 
punitive impact of its actions against auditors under Rule 
2(e). As more insight is gained into the consequences of 
a Rule 2(e) action, the SEC will be able to better 
determine when such an action is an appropriate regulatory 
response in dealing with audit firms. Evidence of 
disparate impact upon audit firms of different sizes may 
cause the SEC to consider alternate disciplinary 
procedures for smaller audit firms.
The results of this research also have implications 
for audit firms. Knowledge of the factors influencing a 
client's decision to switch auditors following events that 
adversely affect auditor credibility will allow auditors 
to more accurately assess the costs of such events. With 
a better understanding of the costs of a decline in 
credibility, auditors will be better equipped to determine 
the optimal level of resources allocated to maintaining 
audit quality and minimizing the chances of a credibility 
reducing event. For example, the results of this study 
suggest that an auditor with a client base composed of 
smaller firms has a greater need to avoid events that 
reduce credibility than an auditor that serves larger 
client firms.
Knowledge of which clients are most sensitive to 
changes in auditor credibility should benefit auditors 
that have experienced a decline in credibility. These 
auditors should be able to maximize the effectiveness of 
efforts to retain existing clients and attract new ones.
An understanding of what factors influence a client to 
switch auditors will allow the auditor to identify the 
client firms most likely to leave for another auditor. 
Identification of these "at risk" clients will allow the 
auditor to better target its efforts as it seeks to 
minimize the adverse effects of a loss of credibility.
An auditor seeking to attract new clients after a decline
91
in credibility will be able to identify those firms which 
are most likely to enter into a relationship with the 
auditor. Time and resources would then be used in 
attempts to attract those clients, rather than clients 
whose characteristics indicate little chance of success.
Limitations
The study has several limitations that may affect 
the interpretation of the observed results. First is the 
implicit assumption of this study that SEC actions under 
Rule 2(e) are events that adversely affect auditor 
credibility. Although such an assumption is based on 
prior research (Wilson and Grimlund 1990), if SEC actions 
do not affect auditor credibility the results of this 
study are difficult to interpret.
A second limitation is the assumption that all SEC 
actions were equally damaging to auditor credibility. A 
review of the SEC actions used in the study revealed no 
evident differences in the severity of the penalties 
imposed on the auditors involved. However, the impact of 
SEC actions on credibility may be affected by factors such 
as the publicity surrounding the SEC action, or of the 
alleged audit failure that triggered the SEC action. To 
the extent that these factors created differences in the 
impact of the SEC actions, the results of this study are 
confounded.
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The third limitation is the probability that the 
Switch group includes firms that would have switched 
auditors whether or not the SEC had acted against their 
auditor. An attempt was made to partially control for 
this possibility by deleting from the Switch group firms 
that had switched from one level of auditor to another.
To the extent this procedure did not control for auditor 
switching unrelated to SEC actions inferences about the 
results of this study are clouded.
A fourth limitation of the study is the attempt to 
capture complex constructs with relatively simple 
measures. For example, the geographical nature of 
reaction to changes in auditor credibility, the incentives 
of managers with accounting-based bonus plans, and effects 
of a corporate audit committee are all measured with 
dichotomous variables. To the extent that the measures 
employed do not correctly measure their underlying 
constructs, the inferences that can be drawn from the 
results are clouded.
A fifth limitation is the reliance of the study on 
publicly available information. If the decision to change 
auditors is based on non-public information, then this 
study's results and conclusions are incomplete. An 
example of non-public information that may have affected 
the results is the existence of multi-year audit 
contracts. Clients entering into such contracts may be
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unable to switch auditors, even though they would switch 
in the absence of such a contract. The existence of 
multi-year audit contracts and other non-public 
information are factors confounding the results of this 
study.
Another possible limitation relates to 
interpretation of the results of the variable AUDCOM.
Firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange have been 
required to have audit committees since 1978. Firms 
traded in the over-the-counter market have recently been 
required to form audit committees. Audit committees are 
optional for firms listed on other exchanges. Pincus, 
Rubarsky, and Wong (1989) document the evolution of 
requirements for audit committees, as well as the increase 
in voluntary formation of audit committees in the 1970s 
and 1980s.
This study exeimines events which occur over a period 
of time coinciding with a large increase in the number of 
firms with corporate audit committees. Although each 
client firm included in the sample was matched with 
another client firm from the same time period and from the 
same auditor, the possibility exists that the changes in 
exchange listing requirements or other factors influencing 
the formation of audit committees may affect the results.
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Suggestions for Future Research 
The observed differences between clients of Big 
Eight auditors and clients of smaller auditors suggest 
that the nature of the demand for auditor credibility is 
more complex than has been developed in the accounting 
literature to date. The failure of agency theory to 
effectively model a firm's response to declines in 
external auditor credibility supports this view. Future 
research could develop and explore alternative theories of 
the demand for auditor credibility.
Most accounting research to date has assumed that 
auditor credibility is a constant, and has examined 
clients' changing demands for auditor credibility.
Missing from the accounting literature is an examination 
of the forces that change credibility over time. An 
avenue for future research would be an analysis of the 
intertemporal aspects of auditor credibility.
Third, the current research could be extended to 
other events that possibly affect auditor credibility. 
Litigation against auditors might be examined to determine 
its impact on auditor credibility. Other regulatory 
actions could also be examined for evidence of adverse 
effects due to declines in credibility.
A fourth direction for future research is suggested 
by the findings of this study regarding audit committees.
A better understanding of the role of the audit committee
in the firm and its effect on the firm's decision making 
processes is needed. Future research could more closely 
examine whether the existence of a corporate audit 
committee does, in fact, inhibit auditor switching.
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